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Abstract
Using the system dynamics methodology, we
model the minimum viable product (MVP) approach
to product development and examine the impact of
release frequency, planning practices and committed
reengineering capacity on software development
outcomes. We leverage the organizational learning,
Lean Startup, and Agile methodology literature to
form the underpinnings of the model and measure
outcomes using cumulative market cost of failing to
meet market wants and cumulative engineering cost.
While shorter release cycles are better in general for
achieving market fit, the relationship is moderated by
planning delays and committed reengineering
capacity. We show that reducing the extent of pivot in
each iteration may be better for firms. Firms instead
should iterate moderately and not radically during
any particular release. Counter intuitively, planning
delays are beneficial by reducing overreaction to
spurious market signals. Finally, we discuss
implications of our findings for future research on
learning and planning amongst entrepreneurial
firms.

1. Introduction
Nascent markets face high levels of uncertainty
and ambiguity about product definitions and industry
structures [34]. The minimum viable product (MVP)
development approach, which helps firms reduce
their information uncertainty about the market and
their customers, has become the new conventional
wisdom in entrepreneurial firms in nascent markets.
MVP is part of a hypothesis-driven entrepreneurship
style that is commonly associated with lean startup
[33], disciplined entrepreneurship [39], and Agile
software development [e.g. 1]. At its core, it stresses
learning about what customers value through a
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systematic cycle of testing value propositions rapidly
with real customers to eliminate waste in the software
development process. According to Eisenmann, Ries
and Dillard [2, p.1], “an entrepreneur translates her
vision into falsifiable business model hypotheses, and
then tests those hypotheses using a series of
minimum viable products (MVPs). Each MVP
represents the smallest set of activities needed to
disapprove a hypothesis.” Hypotheses are tested in
short prototyping cycles or releases. These releases
are in many cases deliberately coincident with agile
sprint development cycles [7, 14]. The first objective
of MVP is to maximize the amount of learning and
uncertainty reduction with the minimum resources
expended by the firm. The second objective is to
enable the firm to decompose the needs of the
customer, to enable development of the full product
in a flexible and modular approach that can be
expanded upon in future scaling or pivoting efforts.
Practitioner literature has recommended shorter
release cycles that enable faster feedback loop from
software development efforts. However, this raises an
important question that, to the best of our knowledge,
has not been addressed in the literature: how should
an entrepreneurial firm organize its MVP
development process to optimize the search for
product market fit? Are shorter release cycles always
better? Are there other factors that must be
considered? The goal of this study is to question the
conventionally received benefits of developing new
software using the MVP approach by identifying
boundary conditions that facilitate or inhibit the
search for product-market fit. In examining how
MVP processes are designed, our research helps to
clarify when and how the MVP approach to software
development during new software development helps
or harms entrepreneurial firms.
Our approach to studying the MVP development
process is to draw from existing knowledge and
theory in the organization sciences, operations
management, and software development literatures to
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develop a formal model of MVP approach to new
software development. We then run computational
“experiments” using the formal model to examine the
dynamic effects of different release and market
conditions on the product-market fit of the solution,
keeping in mind the resource constraints of the
entrepreneurial firm.
Simulation is helpful for analyzing multiple
interdependent processes operating simultaneously
[20], as it allows researchers to gain theoretical
insights through computational experimentation [12]
by extending experimental time horizons beyond the
small number of measurement periods easily
achievable with laboratory and field research. At the
same time, we can examine the conditions
influencing the MVP development process on
outcomes, which is typically infeasible with
qualitative interviews or archival data.
Much of the current work done on the MVP
process is practitioner-based, making it difficult to
clearly define and test theoretical propositions. Our
model hence formalizes the mechanisms and
outcomes associated with MVP development. We
also use the model to examine conditions that
influence the outcomes of the MVP process.
We briefly review the literature on MVP,
learning and planning for entrepreneurial firms in the
next section. We then describe the specification of
the model developed and the results of computational
experiments that examine the factors that influence
the outcome of the MVP process. Using causal loop
diagramming, we describe the model and our
findings. Finally, we highlight some theoretical and
managerial implications of this work.

2.0 Conceptual background
2.1 Minimum Viable Product Approach
Scholars and practitioners have often proposed
the use of rapid prototyping, such as the MVP
approach, for reformulation of problems and
solutions identified in their design processes to guide
decision-making. While the MVP terminology is
fairly recent and unique to the lean startup
methodology popularized by Ries [33], the principles
of incremental and iterative design and
implementation are common to Agile Development
methods, such as scrum or Extreme Programming
(XP), as well. The goal is to make software
development faster and nimbler.
Short cycles of hypothesis generation and testing
in the MVP approach create pressures on teams to
develop functional prototypes in quick iterations

[8,30]. While the MVP approach provides structure
and direction for the software development process
and reduces waste, it may lead to incremental search
for solutions, thus inhibiting the development of
innovative, disruptive solutions. Early stage startups
in nascent markets are in the exploratory stage, in
which startups have to learn, make sense of and adapt
to changes in the market and firm.
While little has been done theoretically to study
MVP projects, it can be grounded in the literature on
entrepreneurial experimentation [36,41], rapid
product innovation [27,40], and learning from
failures [31,37]. However, it has not yet elaborated at
depth in the literature how to organize and optimize
these release cycles and firm capabilities for MVP
development.
In the Agile Development literature, sprints
result in the iterative development of potentially
shippable product. In many cases, sprints are
coincident with product releases [14], other times not.
However, the goal of Agile development is in part to
increase market validation through more rapid release
cycles [7]. What is emphasized typically in the
release planning process is prioritization based on
user stories that maximize utility for users, while
considering the software development team’s
constraints [29]. The success of a release planning
phase on software development depends on the
accuracy of estimates of time and resources required
to develop features requested by users while
accounting for firm-specific development constraints
[e.g. 18]. While specific optimization models have
been developed, for instance with data warehousing
teams [19], to help release (and sprint) planning, the
focus in these models is on task complexity and not
on the speed of iteration or the entrepreneurial firm’s
reengineering capabilities, such as commitment to
reengineering in each iteration.

2.2 Learning and planning in entrepreneurial
firms
Understanding of the role of planning in
entrepreneurial endeavors in uncertain markets is
ambiguous. The entrepreneurship literature is
inconclusive about the role of business planning for
nascent entrepreneurial firm [e.g. 3,9]. Broadly, these
studies examine planning behaviors that are often
more formal and culminate in the development of
business plans, which differs from goal setting during
release cycles, which would be more akin to
emergent strategy [32]. Nevertheless, some
researchers believe that planning is a rational process
that enables entrepreneurs to gather and make sense
of the information available to exploit opportunities
[11,15], which is especially critical given the
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resource constraints entrepreneurial firms face.
Conversely, others believe that planning can take
time away from more valuable processes and
organization [13], particularly in a nascent market
with high uncertainty and frequent changes [10,17].
This is further supported by findings that showed that
planning may not have any significant impact on new
venture performance [e.g. 13]. The commitment to
planning thus becomes particularly challenging, but
yet potentially critical in rapid release cycles under
the MVP approach, since time and resources are both
scarce.
Additionally, some of the prior work on
organizational learning has largely focused on the
exploitation of known opportunities with the goals of
cost minimization and value capture [e.g. 1,14,15]. In
the MVP approach, evaluation of value capture is
then determined through release of prototypes to test
hypotheses about utility returns. The experimental
approach is supported by scholars who suggested the
value of failing fast and often [1,35], particularly
through frequent experiments and iterations. Implicit
in the MVP approach is the opportunity for
experiential learning through quick feedback loops
and validated learning. Experiential learning is
believed to improve the performance of innovations,
particularly in nascent conditions [2,3]. In this sense,
experiential learning that occurs through the MVP
development process enable entrepreneurs to learn
and improve their performance, amidst the
uncertainty and causal ambiguity [2]. Actions and
decisions of entrepreneur enable the creation of value
[3] continuously through feedback and iterations,
while focusing less on the value of past experiences.
However, learning is particularly challenging in
a nascent market. Causality is difficult to untangle
due to the presence of noisy, ambiguous signals
[24,28]. As such, firms can respond to the wrong
signals that they think they have learned when
connections between actions and outcomes may have
been mis-specified or misinterpreted [26]. Frequent
iterations and failures may also lead to
entrepreneurial firms falling into failure traps [25], as
they give up too quickly on a value creation
opportunity, or respond to perceived reasons for
failure. These two streams of literature contradict
each other and it is unclear what are the boundary
conditions in MVP development processes that may
lead to learning that improves outcomes versus
learning to fail.

3.0 The model
We start with a number of assumptions to keep
the system dynamics model [18] as parsimonious as

possible. We then give an overview using a causal
loop diagram of the model and then delve in detail
into a description of the market feedback and the
product engineering loops.

3.1 Assumptions
The following are the base assumptions of the model.
1. Each simulation runs from an initial time of 0.0
weeks to a final time of 100.0 weeks.
2. The entrepreneurial firms are engaged in
sequential search, not simultaneous search.
3. Market wants are represented by a value along
the x-axis. The value drifts over time as a result
of pressures on the market outside of the
boundary of the model. This drift is modeled by
the accumulation of a pink noise drift process
[38].
𝑑
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑘  𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑡 = 𝑥 𝑡 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝑥  ~  𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚 0, 𝜎 ;  
𝑑𝑡
!
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝑊𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠(𝑡) = Pink Noise (t);
!"
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑘  𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒 0 =   0, 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝑊𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 0 = 100.

4.

Note: σ is a constant throughout the simulation.
The released product represents where the
product (as seen by the market) lies on the same
x-axis as market wants. It is re-set to equal the
next generation product after every release cycle
is completed. (Release) Cycle length, a decision
variable, governs how often a new version of the
product is released.
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑡
= 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡  𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡   𝑠   ,

5.

where s is the time at which the most recent
release cycle was completed.
Reengineering capacity is a constant that
represents how many resources the firm commits
to reengineer next-generation products over the
simulation. Reengineering capacity is a proxy for
the firm’s commitment to resources for
responding to feedback obtained through
learning. Importantly, this is not a function of the
firm’s total capability, but rather a strategic
decision of how many engineering resources
should be dedicated to affect innovation in the
next MVP iteration for this particular product.
Mathematically, reengineering capacity is
proxied by the fractional amount the product gap
(see Figure 1) closes each time period to a target
following Sterman’s [38] goal seeking structure.

𝑑
𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡  𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡  𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡   𝑡
− 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡  𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡   𝑡
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6.

Error in measurement: the learning obtained
from each release of the product is not perfect,
but rather contains some “noise,” i.e.
measurement error [5]. This is represented by a
normally distributed variable “measurement
error.” By adding measurement error to market
wants, a new variable “market feedback” is
created, which represents the distortion inherent
in measuring the market. Note that market
feedback is only updated after each release,
when the firm can obtain a new read on market
wants.

8.

9.

𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑡
= 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝑊𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠   𝑠
+ 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟(𝑠)  
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟(𝑠)  ~  𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚 0, 𝜈 ,  
where ν is a constant and s is the time of the most
recent release.

7.

Firms often attempt to filter out measurement
error (or “noise”) from data—such as market
feedback in this model—in some manner or
other [38]. The simplest method is to form a
target that is the function of an exponentially
weighted moving average [38]. The planning
delay in this model represents the time frame
over which the market wants data is averaged.
After each release, the filtered data is used to set
the new product target, which the firm then tries
to reengineer the next generation product to
match.
𝑑
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡  𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑡
𝑑𝑡

1
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦
∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘   𝑡
− 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡  𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡   𝑡
=

Exogenous
Market Drift
+

Market Wants

Performance of the entrepreneurial firm can be
measured by many factors, such as rate of
learning, rate to product launch, product-market
fit, innovativeness of product, or revenue. In this
case, we evaluated performance by using market
cost and engineering cost. These different
notions of performance have impact on the short
and long run strategies of a firm. Future research
will begin to dissect the boundary conditions of
our models in which these nuances will be of
influence.
Engineering cost represents how much product
development costs over a given period. It is
modeled as proportionate to the change in next
generation product as it occurs over a release
cycle. The cumulative engineering cost is the
accumulation of engineering cost over the entire
simulation. Note that “ABS” represents the
absolute value function.
𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 =
!

𝛼 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑆
𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡  𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑡 ,  and
!"
𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 =
!"#$%  !"#$
   !
𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑡   𝑑𝑡,
where α is a constant.

10. Market cost is proportionate to the market gap,
which is the absolute distance that the released
product differs (as measured along the x-axis)
from market wants. If the released product is
closer to market wants (i.e. the market gap is
smaller), then its market fit is better and market
cost is less. (Both costs were also modeled as the
square of the market gap, but it made no impact
qualitatively with respect to this papers’ results.)

+
Market Gap

Measurement
Error

+

B
+
RELEASE
CYCLE LENGTH

MARKET
FEEDBACK LOOP

Market Feedback
PLANNING
DELAY

+

Released Product

Product Target

-

+
Next Generation
Product

B

PRODUCT
ENGINEERING
LOOP

+
Product Gap

+

Figure 1: Causal Loop Diagram

-

REENGINEERING
CAPACITY
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𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑡
=𝛽
∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑆 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝑊𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑡
− 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑡 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝛽  𝑖𝑠  𝑎  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡,
𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
!"#$%  !"#$

=   
where β is a constant.

𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑡   𝑑𝑡
!

3.2 Overall causal loop structure
Given these assumptions, we now turn to the
structure of the model, an overview of which is
presented in Figure 1. The loops are represented
using standard system dynamics causal loop notation
[38]. Because of space limitations, the way these are
derived is not described here, but is based on a
“stock-and-flow” methodology and is developed
following standard system dynamics methodology as
described in Sterman [38] and Forrester [18].

familiar with Agile in a software context—in a
startup launch planning course in a Top-10 workingprofessional entrepreneurship master’s degree
program. The loop reflects how the gap between
released product and market wants provide feedback
to the subsequent product development process and
released product. The actual next-generation product
developed is influenced by the firm’s reengineering
capacity, which constrains the rate of product
development. It is also influenced by the planning
delay, which smooths market gap data in an attempt
to reduce measurement error. Increased smoothing,
however, also increases the time needed to react to a
true change in the market. The release cycle length
affects both the frequency of released product and
frequency of market feedback through information
gained from each iteration of software product
released. The gap between released product and
market wants results in a market cost.

Figure 2: Stock and Flow diagram

The stock and flow model is depicted in Figure
2. The parameters of the model are stylized, but
drawn from typical values in product development.
To find these values, we draw from interviews
conducted with numerous software project managers
as part of a study funded by the National Science
Foundation as described in [4] as well as one author’s
experience gleaned over the past five years while
teaching Agile and MVP methodology to students—
many of whom were project managers already

4.0 Findings
4.1 Release cycle lengths
4.1.1 Effects of shorter release cycles on market
cost
The simulation results show that in general, as release
cycle length increases, the market gap and
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with respect to market fit. Each
MVP iteration reduces information
uncertainty about the market wants.
However, release cycle length is
not the only consideration. For
instance, with the shortest release
cycle of 2 weeks, it is evident that
reengineering capacity and planning
delay can moderate the effect of
release cycle length on cumulative
market cost. In particular, greater
reengineering capacity actually
increases market cost (and reduces
market fit), particularly when there
is no planning delay. This effect is
particularly salient with shorter
release cycles.
Figure 3: Release cycle length and cumulative market cost

1

4.1.2 Effects of shorter release
cycles
on
engineering
cost.
Engineering cost increases with
change in the next generation
product. Hence, one would expect
that shorter release cycles would
result in more MVP iterations and
increase the cumulative engineering
cost.
However, in Figure 4, we start
to see the differential impact of
including planning delays and
altering reengineering capacity on
the cumulative engineering cost,
particularly with shorter release
cycles. We delve further into the
effects of planning delay and
reengineering capacity in the
following sections.

4.2 Planning delay
4.2.1 Effect of planning delay on
engineering cost Figure 4 shows
that as the planning delay increases, cumulative
engineering cost decreases, assuming release cycle
length and reengineering capacity remain unchanged.
This mirrors the findings on release cycle length and
marketing cost, and suggests that increased planning
delay reduces the likelihood of firms reacting to
spurious signals, the engineering equivalent of a dog
chasing its own tail. Hence, incorporating planning
delays allows any “noise” in market feedback may be
filtered out, thus reducing wasted engineering effort
and resulting engineering cost.

Figure 4: Release cycle length and cumulative engineering cost

cumulative market cost increases. Market cost
reflects the gap between market want and released
product (see figure 31). This suggests that if the
release cycle is longer, the firm is likely to persist in
the wrong direction. Shorter release cycles are better
1

In Figure 3-6, “Cap” represents the reengineering capacity (the
fractional rate at which the product gap is shrunk per week) and
“PD” represents the planning delay in weeks. Each series
represents results for a given reengineering capacity and planning
delay. Each point in a data series represents, at a particular release
cycle length, the average of 1000 Monte Carlo simulations of the
cumulative market cost over each simulation.
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4.3 Reengineering Capacity
4.3.1 Effect of reengineering
capacity on engineering cost The
findings from figure 5 suggest that
more reengineering capacity can
actually be harmful. As reengineering
capacity increases, so too does
engineering cost. This is as one would
expect because a greater reengineering
capacity is a function of more
engineering resources allocated to the
product.

Figure 5: Reengineering capacity and cumulative engineering cost

4.3.2 Effect of reengineering
capacity on market cost Figure 6
shows
that
an
increase
in
reengineering capacity increases the
marketing cost. This may seem
counterintuitive initially, as the goal of
the MVP approach is to learn and
incorporate user feedback in the
software development.
This suggests that if the pivot
were too big, the firm may be worse
off. This may be similar to the earlier
finding that perhaps reaction to
spurious signals may set the firm
down the wrong path in its software
development. What is particularly
interesting is that moderate release
cycle length (CL) and planning delay
(PD) offers the best result in terms of
closing the market want gap. When
there is no planning delay or too much
planning delay, the firms are worse off
than with moderate planning delays.

Figure 6: Reengineering capacity and cumulative marketing cost

4.2.2 Effect of planning delay on market cost With
shorter release cycles, market wants are sampled
more often. Figure 3 suggests that if the release cycle
length is short and not moderated by inclusion of a
planning delay, the firm can pivot frequently with
limited planning and sense making of the feedback.
For instance, at a reengineering capacity (“Cap”) of
25%, increased planning delay results in decreased
market cost. We posit that this is because the
planning delay allows the firm to filter out noise that
was captured during the evaluation and learning
period and reduces the chance of acting on spurious
market changes, thus bringing the product closer to
meeting market wants over the long run.

5.0 Discussion
Overall, our findings support practitioner
recommendation that more frequent release cycles
improve market fit. This has been supported by
streams of literature that have also suggested the
route of failing fast and often [1,35]. Shorter release
cycles enable firms to have a feel of what the market
is doing, similar to the idea of doing many parallel
searches, in which the more places a firm is
searching, the more likely they will have one that will
work out [9]. With shorter release cycles, firms get
more frequent feedback and the opportunity to try
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more options that could potentially reduce the
likelihood of developing the wrong features.
Crucially, however, this is only true if the firm
reacts incrementally through pivots in multiple
releases (i.e. scaling) rather than radically to the
additional market signals gained from short release
cycles. This can be accomplished in two ways. First,
incorporation of a planning delay enables learning
and sense-making while reducing overreaction to
spurious signals. What the “fail fast and often”
stream of literature ignores is that frequent failure
may lead to firms falling into failure traps, as they
give up too quickly in response to negative market
feedback that could have been noise. Particularly in a
resource constrained entrepreneurial firm, negative
feedback from an MVP may lead the entrepreneurial
firms to give up too quickly and choosing to make
radical shifts through pivots, as opposed to focusing
on developing one opportunity. This may be
detrimental to the long term growth of the company.
Secondly, the findings concerning reengineering
capacity suggest the need for restraint in responding
to market feedback. The increase in engineering costs
with reengineering capacity increases reinforce these
findings, and suggest that commitment of more
reengineering capacity can actually be harmful.
Overreacting to market signals can hurt the firm,
particularly given the uncertainty and ambiguity in a
nascent market. This also suggests that shorter
release cycles may not lead to a proportional increase
in learning. The general recommendation in the Agile
methodology and lean startup literature suggests that
development teams incorporate user feedback with
highest perceived utility in subsequent iterations in
order to close the market gap to the best of the firm’s
ability, while considering their development
constraints. However, user feedback from each
iteration should also be evaluated carefully and not
responded to completely. Our findings suggest that
firms need to exhibit restraint in reengineering during
each iteration and not invest too much in pivots, so as
to avoid investing in changes based upon spurious
market signals.
Together, these findings suggest that while more
frequent release cycles are often beneficial, they may
not be in certain environments, such as short planning
delays or high engineering capacity leading to firm
overreaction. Thus, we believe that release planning
can be further optimized beyond solely shrinking the
release cycle without thought for other organizational
factors. Firms must leverage planning practices and
restrain over-commitment of reengineering capacity
in their MVP processes to maximize learning and
conserve resources.

6.0 Limitations
Software development in a nascent uncertain
market is complex and our findings suggest that this
process is amenable to planning. Our use of system
dynamics allow us to examine the boundary
conditions that impact the relationship between
release cycle lengths and product outcomes, in terms
of engineering and marketing cost of failing to meet
market wants.
This model offers a simplified view of the
dynamic model of MVP development as guided by
market feedback. While these findings are all
intriguing, however, there is still a great deal of
research that must be done to further examine the
interactions and mechanisms. There are other
limitations of this model that should be mentioned
that will be addressed in future models. The first is
the exclusion of technology and demand uncertainty,
both of which would significantly increase the market
and engineering costs and market measurement error,
the further one is away from the target market want.
This is particularly true of a nascent market in which
the entrepreneurial firm is also in the process of
market creation or disruption, because users would be
continually educated about the novel technology and
their desired requirements for the novel technology.
Secondly, the path-dependent nature of design
decisions cannot be overlooked and is work in
progress. It can be imagined that with longer release
cycles and reduced frequency of feedback, a firm can
continue down a wrong path. Similarly, with quicker
feedback, a firm may pivot frequently and lead the
firm down a different path that meets a different
market need. Path dependence also affects capability
investment of the firm; wasteful investment may have
detrimental impact on the survival of a resource
constrained entrepreneurial firm.
Thirdly, we assumed that market wants can be
modeled by a single goal along one dimension of
performance as affected by a simple drift mechanism.
However, in a nascent market with market creation
efforts by the entrepreneurial firm, the market want is
likely to be a moving target in multiple dimensions
towards potentially opposing attractors. Hence,
multiple attractors along multiple dimensions may be
indicated.

7.0 Implications for theory
Overall, our results support conventional wisdom
with respect to shorter release cycles in the Agile
development and Lean Startup methodologies.
However, our results also highlight some of the
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boundary conditions of this assertion that may begin
to explain the contradictory evidence for the role of
planning and learning through failures in
entrepreneurial firms.
Firstly, scholars have suggested that in in the
release planning process, the key considerations are
prioritization of user stories that guide feature
development while considering development
constraints of the firm (e.g. Schwaber, 1995; [33]).
Accuracy of estimation is key here [19]. What is not
considered is how planning should be organized, and
in particular, how it should be organized to maximize
learning from release cycles. Research in
management has highlighted contradictory results in
the role of planning for entrepreneurial firms [e.g.
10,16,22], with some arguing that planning enables
sense making and exploitation of opportunities
[11,15] while others contend that planning is
invaluable in an uncertain environment [10,17]. Our
results highlight that that the absence of a planning
delay can actually hurt firms as supported by scholars
[10,17], but too much planning can also reduce
agility and response, worsening firm performance
[e.g. 22].
Secondly, while the value of rapid feedback
through short release cycles cannot be denied, our
findings also highlight the challenges of learning in a
nascent uncertain environment. As alluded to earlier,
experiential learning has been proposed to improve
entrepreneurial firm performance [2,3]. However, our
findings show that learning and enacting this newly
acquired knowledge too rapidly can result in negative
outcomes. We posit a planning delay and restrain in
commitment of reengineering capacity allows the
firm to filter out noise that was captured during the
evaluation and learning period and reduces the
chance of acting on spurious change. A conscious
planning delay allows the entrepreneurial firm to take
time to make sense of the data, but also to allow
fluctuations stabilize, as opposed to acting on
spurious signals. This gives the firm time to untangle
some of the noisy, ambiguous signals [24,28] and
reduce misinterpretation of the feedback obtained
[26]. This is particularly critical for entrepreneurial
firms with severe resource constraints that must make
careful decisions about what features of the software
to develop in each iteration. Investment in
unnecessary capabilities or software development
effort is viewed as wasteful and can be detrimental to
firm survival. As such, this adds to the conversation
on learning amongst entrepreneurial firms and
conversations in Agile Development by highlighting
the need for restraint in responding to the feedback
acquired.

8.0 Implications for practice
This paper was motivated by our desire to
understand if shorter release cycles were always
necessarily better. Other than the costs associated
with frequent iterations (e.g. development and testing
costs), we wanted to examine the factors that
contribute to the benefits of shorter release cycles and
to provide guidance on how to organize and optimize
release frequency. Our simulation results show the
need for business processes to exercise restraint
during release planning to hedge against the risk of
responding to spurious signals in nascent markets.
Spurious signals and the corresponding measurement
errors can be concerns, particularly when target
market wants are further away in the search
landscape. Our work highlights the need for frequent,
but moderate iterations because frequent iterations
enable a firm to explore the market space without
overreacting to spurious market signals.
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